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Conclusion
These tests have arisen primarily as a result of an attempt
by the Commission and the federal courts to deal with modem
economic developments. The conglomerate merger is an invention
fathered by the need to achieve the diversification necessary for
economic growth and often for business survival. In formulating
tests applicable to conglomerate mergers, the authorities have re-
peatedly underlined the fact that they are in no sense establishing
per se rules of illegality. Rather, they are attempting to deal with
the individual aspects of each merger-separate and distinct from
previous decisions. It is all too easy to disregard these disclaimers
and regard the tests as establishing per se rules.
It would be economically convenient if definite rules were
clearly drawn and uniformly accepted so as to enable the lawyer
to more accurately evaluate a proposed conglomerate merger. In
their stead, tests have been developed and applied to meet the
varied economic arrangements presented. Future proposed mergers
must first be examined under each of these tests, and then the
individual finding must be compared and evaluated in order to
determine the cumulative effect of the merger upon competition.
AcCESS OF THE UNINCORPORATED AssociATIoN TO THE FEDRAL
COURTS: VENUE AND DivEnsiTY REsTRICTIONS
The constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction to the
federal courts extends "to Controversies . . . between Citizens
of different States ... ." 1 In Strawbridge v. Curtis 2 the United
States Supreme Court declared that in order to satisfy the require-
ments of diversity it must appear that there is complete diversity,
i.e., no plaintiff being of the same citizenship as any defendant.
According to common-law principles, an unincorporated association
was deemed a citizen of each state wherein a member of the
association was domiciled. 3 The requirement of complete diversity
in a case involving a large unincorporated labor union or a joint
stock company may be a practical impossibility since, in most
cases, at least one member of the association will be a citizen of
the same state as an adverse party. Thus, unless there is a
federal question, these associations are excluded from the federal
2 U.S. COwsT. art III, § 2; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1) (1964).
27 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
s Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
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courts. Two recent cases have examined the present status of
this rule and reached divergent conclusions.4
The establishment of venue requirements has created an
analogous problem. Venue, when jurisdiction is based on diversity
of citizenship, may be laid "only in the judicial districts where
all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." 5 When jurisdiction is
based on a federal question, however, venue must be laid only
where all the defendants reside.8
Traditionally, residence of such associations has been determined
by the separate residences of their members.7  Yet, very often
in the case of large unincorporated associations there is no judicial
district where all their members reside. However, in Sperry
Prods., Inc. v. Association of Am. R.R.s.,s the Second Circuit found
such associations to be analogous to corporations-residence, thereby,
being determined by the association's principal place of business.
The courts, however, are still searching for the limits of this
analogy, and are divided as to whether residence of an association
should include every judicial district where it is doing business.9
The purpose of this note is to discuss the recent developments
in the treatment of unincorporated associations in regard to diversity
jurisdiction and venue. The validity of recent cases and their
import is to be judged on the basis of existing law and inter-
pretation of judicial precedent.
Diversity Jurisdiction
A corporation for diversity jurisdiction purposes is treated,
by statute, as an entity; it is a citizen both of the state of its
incorporation and the state in which its principal place of business
is located.' Prior to the enactment of this statute, the courts
had indulged in the conclusive presumption that all the share-
holders of a corporation were citizens of the state of incorporation."'
Through this fiction corporations enjoyed access to the federal
courts although complete diversity of jurisdiction did not really
exist.
4 Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964); Bou-
ligny v. United Steelworkers, 336 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1964).
528 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1963).
;28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1963).
7Sutherland v. United States, 74 F.2d 89, 93 (8th Cir. 1934); Koons v.
Kaiser, 91 F. Supp. 511, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
8 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942).
9 Compare American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 169 F.
Supp. 777, 781-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), with Cherico v. Brotherhood of RIR.
Trainmen, 167 F. Supp. 635, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
1028 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
11Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328-29(1854); see Green, Corporations as Persons, Citizens, and Possessors of
Liberty, 94 U. PA. L. REv. 202, 226 (1946).
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This fiction was not adopted with respect to unincorporated
associations. In Chapman v. Barney,12 the Supreme Court es-
tablished the rule that citizenship of the unincorporated association
must be determined by reference to the citizenship of each in-
dividual member. Subsequent decisions have upheld this view
even where the association in question was treated as a legal
entity by the states.-3
However, the Supreme Court in Puerto Rico v. Russell &
Co.24 found a Puerto Rican sociedad en comandita to be so
similar to an American corporation that for diversity jurisdiction
the domicile of the sociedad, and not that of its individual share-
holders, was controlling. In analyzing the civil law of Puerto Rico
the Court stated:
therefore to call the sociedad en cmnandita, a limited partnership in the
common law sense . . . is to invoke a false analogy. In the law of
the creator the sociedad is consistently regarded as a juridical person.15
The Russell case is the last direct discussion of this problem
by the Supreme Court. Since, in Russell, the Supreme Court
distinguished prior precedent and confined its discussion to the
peculiarities of Puerto Rican law, subsequent lower court cases
have limited the case to its facts.'
Recently, however, the Second Circuit in Mason v. American
Express Co.,' 7 basing its decision on the Russell case, held that
the Supreme Court had abandoned the mechanical approach of
"labeling" organizations for a more flexible test
which demands that consideration be given to whether an organization's
essential characteristics sufficiently invest it, like a corporation, with
a complete legal personality distinct from that of the members it
represents.18
In reaching this result the court compared the New York joint
stock company to the Puerto Rican sociedad, concluding that
"the joint stock association is as much like a true corporate body
as the sociedad ... ." 19
12129 U.S. 677 (1889). Prior to Supreme Court adjudication of the
question -of citizenship of unincorporated associations, some lower federal
courts had held joint stock companies entities for diversity purposes. Balti-
more & O.R.R. v. Adams Express Co., 22 Fed. 404, 407 (C.C.D. Md. 1884);
Fargo v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry., 6 Fed. 787, 791 (C.C.D. Ind. 1881).
'3 See, e.g., Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207 (1904) ; Arbuth-
not v. State Auto Ins. Ass'n, 264 F.2d 260, 262 (10th Cir. 1959).
1288 U.S. 476 (1933).
1 'Id. at 480-81. (Emphasis added.)
16 See, e.g., Sutherland v. United States, 74 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1934);
Bouligny v. United Steelworkers, supra note 4, at 163-64.
17 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964).
's Id. at 393.
VIId. at 400.
1965 ]
356 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 39
In Bouligny v. United Steelworkers of America20 the Fourth
Circuit, taking a contrary view, limited Russell to its facts.
Although the court was concerned with a union as opposed to a
joint stock company as in Mason, unions are regarded as entities
no less corporate in form.2 ' The court reasoned that "unin-
corporated associations cannot be equated with corporations by a
simple judicial decision attributing citizenship to them," 22 thereby
limiting citizenship of corporate-in-form organizations only to those
labeled "corporation." In so stating, the court referred to the
statutory provision for determining corporate citizenship, 23 and
indicated that only a corporation was to be deemed a citizen in
diversity cases. The court, expressing awareness of informed
sentiment in favor of treating unincorporated associations as
citizens of their principal place of business, stated that such
changes are in the province of the legislature, not the judiciary.24
These two decisions are based on conflicting policies for de-
termining citizenship in diversity cases. One view relies solely
on the label affixed to the organization, while the other analyzes
the attributes of juridical personality possessed by such an
organization.
The resolution of this conflict depends upon the interpretation
of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. This case may be viewed essentially
as an analysis of Puerto Rican civil law and hence limited to its
facts. Contrariwise, it can be interpreted as espousing the principle
that legal personality should be determined by reference to the
attributes of individuality possessed, rather than by reference
to a mere label.
With respect to corporations, the Supreme Court, in discussing
the development of the entity theory, said:
even those who formulated the rule -found its theoretical justification
only in the complete legal personality with which corporations are
endowed.25
Furthermore, in distinguishing prior cases which regarded the
citizenship of associations as that of each member, the Court
said:
but status as a unit for purposes of suit alone . . . not shown to
have the other attributes of a corporation . . . has been deemed a legal
20336 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1964).
21 See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385(1922); Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated
Corporation, 51 YALE L.J. 40, 41 (1941).
22 Bouligny v. United Steelworkers, supra note 4, at 164.
23 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
24 fBouligny v. United Steelworkers, supra note 4, at 164. Cf. S. REP. No.
1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3099, 3101-02 (1958).
25 Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 479 (1933).
personality too incomplete; what was but an association of individuals
for so many ends and a juridical entity for only a few was not easily to
be treated as if it were a single citizen.
2 6
Thus, the Court distinguished prior precedent because those cases
dealt with associations that only had the right to sue and be sued
in their own name, and were devoid of other attributes of legal
personality.2 7 Thus relieved of prior precedent, the Court drew
an analogy between the Puerto Rican sociedad and the cor-
poration, by an examination of the basic characteristics of the
sociedad.
28
In treating the sociedad as a juridical entity the Court
departed from the "label test" employed by Chapman. Although
Russell broke from precedent to the limited degree of allowing
associations, so endowed with a legal personality, to be treated as
corporations, an early Supreme Court case apparently supports
a similar contention. The Court in Marshall v. Baltimore &
O.R.R. said:
it is not reasonable that those who deal with such persons [persons doing
business through corporations] should be deprived of a valuable privilege
by a syllogism, or rather sophism, which deals subtly with words and
names without regard to the things or persons they are used to
represent.
2 9
Thus, the fact that the Court was construing Puerto Rican
civil law is relevant to the question of whether future courts
may delve behind the organization's label to determine if the
designated label is indicative of a meaningful differentiation be-
tween corporations and unincorporated associations. Based on
this interpretation of Rusell, it would seem that a court cannot
be precluded from analyzing peculiarities in local law, when
such uniqueness in Puerto Rican law was a valid topic for analysis.
Furthermore, refusal by the court in Bouligny to determine whether
a juridical personality exists by assimilating the associations to
corporations must be considered error.
Although the rationale of the Mason case finds support in
Russell, its validity is still dependent upon an analysis of the
status of a New York joint stock company. Such an analysis
indicates that the joint stock company is similar to a corporation
-9Id. at 480.2 7id. at 481.
2 Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., supra note 11, at 327-28. Although
this view was expressed with the purpose of holding corporations legal enti-
ties in determining citizenship for diversity purposes, it may be equally valid
with regard to unincorporated associations if the characteristics of legal
personality are deemed present.2 9 E.g., Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N.Y. 167, 177-78, 82 N.E. 1108, 1111 (1907);
People v. Wemple, 117 N.Y. 136, 147-48, 22 N.E. 1046, 1048 (1889).
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in relation to the characteristics deemed important in the Russell
case. The courts of New York, in dealing with the joint stock
company as an entity, have indicated that the association should
be compared to a corporation and, by analogy, the laws relating
to corporations should be complied with. 30 The personality of the
sociedad is almost identical to the New York joint stock company,
and the characteristics singled out by Russell are all present
in the joint stock company.3' Both associations are required to
file public articles of association, may own their own property,
transact business, and sue and be sued in their own name. The
modern sociedad and joint stock company have perpetual existence
regardless of death or withdrawal of individual members, vested
management in the hands of directors with power to bind the
association, and unlimited power of shareholders and members to
transfer their interests. 2 The one outstanding feature still existing
in a joint stock company that evidences an association or partner-
ship personality is the liability of the shareholders or members
individually. Significantly, the members of the sociedad were also
liable individually on the association's obligations, but the Supreme
Court determined that such liability is of no great consequence
and does not change its over-all personality. 3
A comparison of Mason and Bouligny, in the light of the
above analysis of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., establishes Mason
v. American Express Co. as the better reasoned opinion.
Venue
In the case of a corporation, residence for venue purposes
is laid in "any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business. . . ." 3 However,
the statute makes no reference to the residences of unincorporated
associations.
Traditionally, venue for unincorporated associations was de-
termined by reference to the residence of the individual members
without regard to its status under state law.35  Therefore, the
ability of an unincorporated association to sue or be sued in a
federal court was further restricted, because it would be rare
30 Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., upra note 25, at 481.
31 N.Y. Gsx. AsS'Ns LAW §§ 2-6, 12, 13.
82 People v. Coleman, 133 N.Y. 279, 31 N.E. 96 (1892); cf. Hibbs v.
Brown, 190 N.Y. 167, 82 N.E. 1108 (1907).
s3 Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., supra note 25, at 481. There are even
more persuasive indicia of corporate personality existing in the treatment of
the joint stock company under the laws of New York. N.Y. CoNsT. art. X,§ 4; N.Y. TAx LAW §§ 198(3), 208.
3428 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1963); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1963).
35 Sutherland v. United States supra note 16, at 93; Koons v. Kaiser,
91 F. Supp. 511, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
[ VOL, 39
NOTES
to find all the members of an association residing in the same
district.
In Sperry Prods. Inc. v. Association of Am. R.Rs. 6 the
entity theory was established for venue purposes. This new
approach was also adopted without regard to the status of the
association under local law.
The court stressed the procedural nature of venue provisions,
and indicated that an unincorporated association should be treated
as a corporation for venue purposes. An analogy was made to
the corporate venue statute and the residence of the association
was determined to be its principal place of business without
regard to the multiple residences of the individual members.
3 7
The Sperry approach was soon widely adopted and alleviated
somewhat the past difficulties in meeting the venue requirements. s
In 1948, Section 1391(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was passed, liberalizing the venue requirements for
corporations. This section, like its predecessors, did not specifically
mention unincorporated associations.3 0  Thus, the courts were
faced with the problem of whether to apply the new corporate
provisions to unincorporated associations by a further extension
of the Sperry doctrine.
Several courts have held that Sperry may not be enlarged
because the new statute explicitly refers to corporations, and to
interpret it to include unincorporated associations would "be . . .
to say that the revisers were unaware of the difference between
corporations and unincorporated associations." 
40
A contrary view was expressed in Rutland Ry. v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Eng'rs"1 where it was stated that venue
is not a jurisdictional concept but is a doctrine of convenience with
a different policy basis from jurisdiction. The court indicated
that' venue, therefore, should be treated in practical terms, by
reference to the requirements of litigation involving unincorporated
associations, and without regard to metaphysical terminology that
is associated with jurisdiction 4 2  Thus, the court decided that
venue may be laid in the district where the association is doing
business, the residence of such associations being assimilated to
that of corporations.'3
s 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942).
37id. at 411.8 E.g, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Graham, 175 F.2d 802,
804-05 (DC. Cir. 1948); Cherico v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 167 F.
Supp. 635, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
3928 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1963).40 Cherico v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, supra note 38. Accord, e.g.,
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Graham, supra note 38, at 802 n.2;
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Congress, by Section 1391 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, indicated a liberal policy with regard to the difficulty
of complying with venue provisions.4" For venue purposes, cor-
porations are subject to suit in any district where they are doing
business. This requirement, as compared with the previous statute
allowing suit only in the state of incorporation and the state where
the principal place of business was located, is readily seen as
making the venue requirements more easily met.45 This liberal-
ization of venue requirements indicates a consistent policy between
the court in Rutland and Congress.
Conclusion
Federal diversity jurisdiction has been the subject of much
discussion urging its restriction, or perhaps elimination.46 In
expanding diversity jurisdiction, contrary to such suggestions
and general congressional policy,4 7 Mason has rejected the labeling
approach taken by Bouligny, and substituted a concept wherein
organizations of similar structure are afforded like treatment.
Congress itself has provided that corporations are to be
treated as legal entities for diversity purposes, but has not expressly
included unincorporated associations under such a definition. How-
ever, since the Supreme Court has not limited "corporation" to a
mere label, the result reached in Mason rests on firm ground.
Although congressional policy seeking to limit diversity juris-
diction must be respected, fine but illogical distinctions should
not be used to foster that end. It is to be hoped that the potential
for logic, implicit in the Russell-Mason approach, will be exploited
by other courts when faced with similar issues.
The decision in Sperry and the relaxation of venue require-
ments provided in Section 1391(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure tend to support the result in Rutland. Furthermore,
venue, which is basically a formula for the convenience of parties,
should not become a means for limiting access to the federal courts.
"See Comment, The Corporate Plaintiff and Venue Under Section 1319
(c) of the.Judicial Code, 28 U. CHI. L. R~v. 112 (1959).
45 See Note, Doing Business as a Test of Venue and Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations in the Federal Courts, 56 CoLum. L. Rxv. 394, 395-404
(1956).
4 Frankfurter, Distribution of Juridical Power Between United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928). Contra, Yntema, The Juris-
diction of the Federal Courts in Controversies Between Citizens of Different
States, 19 A.B.A.J. 71, 149, 265 (1933); see also Note, 48 MIMN. L. Rzv.
1109 (1964) (extensive comments on the American Law Institute's recom-
mendations for a new diversity jurisdiction statute).
4 See Kessler, Corporations and the New Federal Diversity Statute: A
Denial of Justice, 1960 WAsH. U.L.Q. 239-47; Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 148-
50 (1963); Note, 44 MiN. L. REv. 308, 310-16 (1959).
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Once a court has jurisdiction, its power should not be frustrated
by venue provisions unless the purpose behind those provisions
is being served.
The Rutland case, like the Mason case, indicates a tendency
of the federal courts, at least in the Second Circuit, to accept the
realities of business forms when resolving issues of venue and
jurisdiction, a tendency which has been all too long delayed.
X
AN APPRAISAL OF JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO IMPLY AN INDEM-
NITY CONTRACT IN TIME-BARRED BREAcH OF WARRANTY SUITS
Introduction
In a New York action a third-party plaintiff has the right
to indemnity only when he can show that (as between himself
and the third-party defendant) there exists the relationship of'
"active-passive" tort-feasor or there is an express contract to
indemnify. This comment will endeavor to demonstrate that the
current limitation on an indemnity cause of action is unreasonable,
and further that it fosters injustice and encourages collusive
fraud, especially when the statute of limitations has run on the
underlying cause of action.
New York Case Law
In a recent case' the defendant, a general contractor under
contract with plaintiff to construct a building, was sued for
damages for non-compliance with specifications regarding the
installation of a fuel tank. Plaintiff alleged that the improper
installation caused the tank to become corroded and thus unfit
for use. Under CPLR 1007 the defendant impleaded its
subcontractor, who had installed the tank, seeking indemnification
for any possible liability to the plaintiff. More than six years
had elapsed since the execution of the contract between the
contractor (third-party plaintiff) and the subcontractor (third-
party defendant). In dismissing the third-party complaint the
court held that the statute of limitations barred any action
thereon. Defendant-contractor contended that the statute of
limitations 2 did not bar the suit since the third-party cause
of action was one for indemnity, which would accrue only
1 City & County Say. Bank v. M. Kramer & Son, 43 Misc. 2d 731, 252
N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct 1964).
2 CPLR 213.
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